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Package for Transferable Discharge Permits Game 
 
 
TDP Game:  Instructor’s Guide 
 
This file contains the following information: 
 
1. The guide for the person running the game. 
2. Handouts to give to participants 
3. References for other TDP games that are available on the internet or economics 
journals. 
 
Objectives and General Points 
 
The objective of the game is to simulate a trading regime to exchange rights to some 
currently unpriced (or underpriced) environmental or natural resource, and illustrate how 
trading may lead to an efficient level of pollution (or whatever the good is).   A number 
of scenarios can be tried to illustrate additional points such as the role of imperfect 
competition in the form of few traders, what happens when conditions change for a firm, 
what happens when a new firm enters, and so on.  The number of scenarios attempted 
will depend on the time allotted, group involved, what principles you want to illustrate. In 
the case below, the rights are to emit a physical quantity of pollution.  The game could 
readily be adapted to trading any other sort of right, such as water rights.  No matter what 
happens in the actual game, the participants should come away with a very practical 
sense of how these sorts of markets might work (and not work well). 
 
If one is running the game in a course setting, it should be done after the concepts of a 
tradeable permit have been discussed in theory.  If it is an environmental economics 
game, it is generally done after the students have covered the basic model (equating 
marginal damages to marginal abatement costs) and are discussing environmental policy 
options.  If the game is being run outside of a classroom setting, some more preparatory 
work (and/or simplification of the game) is probably a good idea.  The players can get too 
focused on details not relevant to permit trading or not be comfortable enough with the 
underlying theoretical concepts to trade (or try to make it harder than it is, as was the case 
in our game).  I’ll note areas where it can be simplified. 
 
The instructor/regulator will need very few props: 
• File cards for the permits and to hand out to firms for changes in scenarios. 
• An overhead, whiteboard, to write information about trades on. 
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How to Proceed 
 
If you want to introduce a non-producing buyer of permits (in our case the NGO played 
by Jack) who enters in a later scenario, have a non-player (teaching assistant, for 
example) distribute the WTP survey to fund research for an NGO on GHG and global 
climate change. Give them a few minutes to fill in their response and collect the forms. 
Don’t tell them what the survey is for.  The survey will provide the funds for the NGO to 
bid for the permits in the later scenario.  This wrinkle can be eliminated if you want to 
have a simpler (and shorter game). 
 
Divide group into 6 firms.  Should have no fewer than 2 people per firm.  You can 
modify the game by adding more firms, but then the computation (for you) of the 
efficient equilibrium becomes more complex.   I wouldn’t have fewer firms or the market 
is likely to never be competitive. 
 
Next, hand out the material:  (1)  general instruction sheet; (2) info sheet for each firm – 
tell them they should not reveal their info sheet to any other firm (or they may suffer dire 
consequences); (3) spreadsheet and discussion sheet for each firm.  Make sure there are 
enough copies so they can work on these during the game.  In a class setting, you could 
go over the principles of the game ahead of time, but I wouldn’t hand out the information 
with the equations or some collusion may occur before the game. 
 
The marginal abatement cost functions for the 6 firms are as follows:  [note these firms 
need not be in the same country – can tell them whatever one wants to set the stage.]  A 
key point here is that the MACs differ considerably across and within industries.  A 
permit market requires differences in MACs to operate, but this can also create 
interesting issues depending on how the permits are allocated.  How to allocate the 
permits (if not an auction initially) is something you can experiment with. 
 
Coal-fired power plants (firms 1 and 4) 
MAC1 = 100 – 2Z1
MAC4 = 100 – 4Z4
 
Petroleum refineries (firms 2 and 5) 
MAC2 = 200 – 5Z2
MAC5 = 300 – 20Z5
 
Cement producers (firms 3 and 6) 
MAC3 = 300 – 10Z3
MAC6 = 200 – 10Z6
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Playing the Game 
 
First scenario: The regulator announces that there is no GHG policy in place (the status 
quo) and that each firm should compute its profit-maximizing output levels.  [Give them 
a few minutes to do this.  This is where we got off on an awkward start.  What I intended 
is that firms simply set their MAC = 0 and that determines the level of pollution and 
because one unit of pollution yields one unit of output, also determines the level of 
output. Because the game was set up so that firms had positive profits and MC of 
production are constant, the actual level ofoutput is determinant.  This is not what I 
intended, but that’s where confusion occurred.  One simple way to eliminate this problem 
is to tell everyone what their initial emission level is and that will be where MAC = 0 and 
say they are earning positive profits in the short run due to whatever you want to tell 
them.  A much more complex game would involve giving them MC of production curves 
and have them solve for profit-maximizing output levels that then determine pollution 
levels.  If you do it this way, this initial stage will take more time.  I’ve changed the 
directions to the firms to simply tell them their initial pollution level.]  If you go the 
simple route, then just have them fill in their profits and output levels etc on the spread 
sheet, so they can keep track.  An even simpler game wouldn’t even have the profits, just 
the objective function to minimize total abatement costs. 
 
 
2nd scenario: The regulator then announces that at a meeting of the GHG congress, target 
reductions have been set for each GHG producer.  This is an emission standard that is 
enforceable by shutting down the plant if there is non-compliance.  Announce that each 
firm must reduce its emissions by 20 tonnes per year.  [Note their MACs are for annual 
emissions.]  Ask them to compute the impact on their profits.  Give them a few minutes 
to do so.  This is the command and control base case that represents a uniform standard – 
each firm has to meet the same target level of emissions.  Because of their different 
starting points, some firms will have to cut emissions a lot, others not at all.  The players 
should be computing their total abatement costs at 20 tonnes of GHG emissions.  This is 
the area under their MAC curve from their initial output level to 20 tonnes. 
 
3rd scenario: The GHG congress meets again because it has received complaints from a 
number of industries that the GHG emission standard is adversely affecting their profits 
and inhibiting growth, jobs, etc.  It has decided to convert the standard into a tradeable 
permit.  Each producer will now receive 20 permits, one for each tonne of allowable 
emissions per year.  So the total allowed level of pollution remains at 120 tonnes per 
year, the same as the uniform standard.  These permits are tradeable and divisible into 
fractions of tonnes, like ½ tonne as a minimum.  The rules are that the firm will be 
allowed to emit as much pollution as it has permits for.  It cannot go out of business, i.e., 
sell all its permits and shut down, thereby avoiding any abatement costs because it will 
incur a fixed cost of $1000 to do so.  This penalty should be enough to deter any closures 
and avoid the discontinuity we had by allowing firms to shut down.     
 
The regulator doesn’t want to be involved in any trading of permits that occurs, but will 
help enforce any contracts made.  The firms are free to make any bids/offers they want to 
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each other. Give them a few minutes to decide what to do, then open up the floor for 
trading.  Tell them they have 15 minutes (estimate) to complete any trades they want to 
make.  Don’t make it too long.  Trading will be like any market:  have one trader from 
each firm come to the front of the room and call out bids and asking prices.  The 
regulator can help by posting these on the board or overhead. At the end of the trading 
session, have each firm record what has happened to it (# permits traded, price, and effect 
on profits on their spreadsheet).  The regulator should keep track of what is happening to 
see if they are approaching the efficient equilibrium (solution shown below).  
 
The solution for the efficient  equilibrium  with total Z = 120 tonnes, the efficient permit 
price is $50 per tonne.  With an identical initial (free) allocation of 20 tonnes per firm, the 
following would occur (in an efficient permit market) after the trades.  You won’t tell 
them this until after the end of the game. 
 
Firm Z Permits bought (B) or sold (S) 
        1       25  B 5 
        2  30  B 10 
        3  25  B 5 
        4  12.5  S 7.5 
        5  12.5  S 7.5 
        6  15  S 5 
 
 
Regardless of whether they reach the efficient equilibrium, announce that the ‘year’ is 
over and they again have 20 new permits for the upcoming year and they can start trading 
again. You may want to repeat this same scenario in another round or even two, after they 
have had time to see what happened to their profits.  Firms may be reluctant to trade at 
first, want to see what is happening in the market, etc.   
 
If they are sophisticated traders and reached the efficient equilibrium, or you just want to 
move on, the next scenario brings in the NGO to whom they made a WTP donation at the 
beginning of the game. 
 
 
4th scenario: The Ecolecon director now shows up and starts bidding for permits, the 
amount bid is dependent upon the total payments pledged to it at the beginning of the 
session.  [The Ecolecon director can be left to his/her own devices in this, or briefed on 
what to do – e.g., bid high enough to disrupt whatever equilibrium was reached, if indeed 
they got to the efficient equilibrium.]  Make sure everyone records the results.  Ecolecon 
can now stay in the game (if it hasn’t spent all its money).  This is supposed to create a 
situation of excess demand for permits, the price should rise.  Those firms with excess 
permits to sell will make higher profits in this round than they did before. 
 
 
5th scenario:  Another new year:  regulator now takes away all their permits and gives 
each firm a card that only it sees; where the permits are distributed unequally, according 
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to the following:  Firms 1 and 2 get 40 permits each.  All the rest get 10 permits each.  
Repeat the trading.  This should give rise to the potential for some non-competitive 
behaviour on the part of the firms with most of the permits.  They may try to hold out for 
higher permit prices as firms who only have 10 face high total abatement costs.  
Alternatively, they may try to dump some excess permits because they are emitting so 
much pollution that their TAC are quite low.  It is hard to predict what will happen. 
 
Also ask them if they want to change their pledge to Ecolecon for that year.  If so, hand 
in a payment card (give them a file card to fill out).  Ecolecon may have to sit out if its 
pledges drop (as they probably will because firms now know how these pledges are being 
used). 
 
6th scenario:  Another new year: The regulator takes away all permits and announces that 
it will be auctioning them to the firms.  The regulator can post an asking price, do an oral 
auction, or whatever necessary to get them to start bidding. In principle, if the efficient 
price was reaching with the ‘free’ allocation of permits, a competitive auction should also 
lead to the efficient price.  There should be no difference. 
 
7th scenario: The regulator visits some of the firms before the trading begins in a new 
year and gives them a card that indicates that some condition relevant to them has 
changed.  You can try the following:  [we never got this far] 
 
Firm #1:  “Good news!  Due to a shortage of petroleum, the price of electricity has risen 
to $150 per unit.”  [This of course should not change any trading on the margin because it 
doesn’t affect their MAC, just profits] 
Firm 2:  “Your MC of production have fallen to $2 per unit because of a technological 
change.  Your MAC curve does not change.”  {This again should not affect any permit 
trading] 
Firm #3:  No change from last year. 
Firm #4:  “Bad news.”  Your power plant has been discovered to be discharging toxic 
chemicals into a nearby river.  You are shut down for one year while you fix the problem.  
This doesn’t affect any of your costs, you are just not going to buy permits this year.”   
Firm #5:  “Your engineers have discovered a cheaper way to abate your GHG emissions.  
Your MAC curve is now:  $300 – 50 Z5.”  [This means that their TACs are a lot lower 
and they will now want fewer permits] 
Firm #6:  “Your cement plant is old and machinery is wearing out.  Your MC of 
production are now $15 per unit.  Your MAC does not change.”  [This will make the firm 
need more permits to not incur a loss.  In the old efficient equilibrium it needed 15 
permits, in this case it needs at least one more]. 
 
This should be more than enough to give them a real taste of a market.  Give them time to 
fill out their discussion sheets; hand in a copy to the moderator, keep a copy for 
themselves and then go through the questions in a discussion with them.  Ask each firm 
to present their views for each question, then discussion.   You may want to modify the 
discussion sheet.  These are just suggestions for how to get them to participate.  You 
might not even need a discussion sheet.   
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Other things to discuss: 
 
1. Show them the equilibrium price and efficient number of permits for each firm if they 
don’t get to this outcome.  You can put up an overhead with the MACs of each firm 
shown and how at $50, they reach the target level of emissions of 120 tonnes per year 
and because each firm is paying the same price for a permit, it is a cost effective 
equilibrium.  [If you are doing this in a course, you might give them all the MAC 
equations and have them prove that this equilibrium minimizes the sum of the total 
abatement costs for the emitters, i.e., no other price will yield both the target being 
met exactly and lower sum of TACs across the firms.  Have them compare these TAC 
to those under the uniform standard.] 
 
2. Which firms bought/soldpermits and why? 
 
3. What might happen if the costs of closing down a firm for a year or more were much 
lower than assumed? 
 
4. Have them try to derive the demand curve for permits. 
 
5. What does the supply curve look like?  What if the regulator did not tell the firms the 
total number of permits for sale each year?  Would this change anything? 
 
6. Would this sort of market work for GHGs?  For other markets?  What are some of the 
key difficulties a TDP market would likely encounter?  [They should have seen a 
number of these illustrated in their game – e.g., imperfect information, no one knows 
the other firms’ MAC curves, collusion, monopoly/monopsony.   
 
7. A key issue in any permit market is how to allocate the permits initially.  What are 
some alternatives and the pluses and minuses of each method? 
 
8. Should Ecolecon (the NGO) be allowed to bid for permits? 
 
There is lots more to discuss, which could take another full class in a teaching setting.  At 
any rate, they should have fun and learn a lot about how markets can work. 
 
The hand out sheets for the participants follow (corrected for typos and with some 








A Tradeable Emission Permit Game for  




Global climate change will affect all nations.  Predictions are that average temperatures 
will rise and there will be more severe weather events.  The variance in temperature and 
rainfall is expected to rise.  If ocean levels rise, coastal areas will be inundated.  This will 
adversely affect people and production.  Migration to higher elevations may be necessary 
and valuable ecosystems may be lost.  Greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane, and 
others are the compounds felt to be responsible for global climate change.  Emissions of 
these gases from human activities have doubled in the past 35 years.  Scientists and many 
policy makers argue that all countries must begin to reduce their emissions of greenhouse 
gases now to help.  The difficulty is that greenhouse gases (GHGs) are released from the 
combustion of fossil fuels, agriculture, and other manufacturing processes (e.g., cement).  
Emissions cannot be controlled with pollution abatement equipment.  Less combustion of 
fossil fuels or investment in carbon sinks (e.g., forests) to absorb carbon dioxide are the 
only practical ways to reduce emissions.  Reduction of energy consumption will 
adversely affect current output.  This tradeoff between the environment and economy has 
hampered significant policy action in many countries. 
 
There are proposals to introduce a tradeable emission permit system to help reach GHG 
targets set by each country.  Thus far, no system has been established.  Why not?  Can a 





There are 6 firms that release GHGs as a by-product of their production process.  They 
may be in different industries.  Each firm will receive data on its production process and 
the amount of GHGs produced per unit output.  A government regulator will be 
introducing policies in different scenarios that each firm must respond to.  Firms will be 
monitored to ensure that they comply with the regulations.  To help firms determine their 
best strategy, each will receive a work sheet.  Firms are assumed to maximize 
profits/minimize costs.  At the end of the activity, each firm will fill out a summary 





Instructions and worksheet 
 
You are a coal-fired power plant that produces electricity that can be sold at a constant 
price of $100 per unit. Your marginal costs of producing electricity are $50 per unit.  
Each unit of electricity you produce also produces one tonne of GHG pollution.  Your 
marginal costs of abating GHGs are given by: 
 
MAC1  =  100  - 2Z1   where Z1  is the tonnes of GHGs you release.  
 
Your initial level of emissions is 50 tonnes of GHGs per year. 
 
A government regulator will be announcing various policies to help reduce GHG 
emissions.  Your job is to choose a pollution level (which also then determines your 
output level) that minimizes your total abatement costs. 
 
If you cease production in any year, you will incur a fixed charge of $1000 to cover costs 
of closing your plant and laying off your work force. 
 
To help your calculations, a spreadsheet is attached. 
 
Circumstances may change during this regulatory period.  The regulator will inform you 




Instructions and worksheet 
 
You are a petroleum refinery that sells diesel fuel at a constant price of $50 per unit. Your 
marginal costs of producing diesel fuel are $10 per unit.  Each unit of diesel fuel you 
produce also produces one tonne of GHG pollution.  Your marginal costs of abating 
GHGs are given by: 
 
MAC2  =  200  - 5Z2   where Z2  is the tonnes of GHGs you release.  
 
A government regulator will be announcing various policies to help reduce GHG 
emissions.  Your job is to choose a pollution level (which also then determines your 
output level) that minimizes your total abatement costs. 
 
Your initial level of emissions is 40 tonnes of GHGs per year. 
 
If you cease production in any year, you will incur a fixed charge of $1000 to cover costs 
of closing your plant and laying off your work force. 
 
 
To help your calculations, a spreadsheet is attached. 
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Circumstances may change during this regulatory period.  The regulator will inform you 




Instructions and worksheet 
 
You are a cement producer who can sell your product at a constant price of $20 per unit. 
Your marginal costs of producing cement are $5 per unit.  Each unit of cement you 
produce also produces one tonne of GHG pollution.  Your marginal costs of abating 
GHGs is given by: 
 
MAC3  =  300  - 10Z3   where Z3  is the tonnes of GHGs you release.  
 
A government regulator will be announcing various policies to help reduce GHG 
emissions.  Your job is to choose a pollution level (which also then determines your 
output level) that minimizes your total abatement costs. 
 
Your initial level of emissions is 30 tonnes of GHGs per year. 
 
If you cease production in any year, you will incur a fixed charge of $1000 to cover costs 
of closing your plant and laying off your work force. 
 
To help your calculations, a spreadsheet is attached. 
 
Circumstances may change during this regulatory period.  The regulator will inform you 




Instructions and worksheet 
 
You are a coal-fired power plant that produces electricity that can be sold at a constant 
price of $100 per unit. Your marginal costs of producing electricity are $50 per unit.  
Each unit of electricity you produce also produces one tonne of GHG pollution.  Your 
marginal costs of abating GHGs is given by: 
 
MAC4  =  100  - 4Z4   where Z4  is the tonnes of GHGs you release.  
 
A government regulator will be announcing various policies to help reduce GHG 
emissions.  Your job is to choose a pollution level (which also then determines your 
output level) that minimizes your total abatement costs. 
 
Your initial level of emissions is 25 tonnes of GHGs per year. 
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If you cease production in any year, you will incur a fixed charge of $1000 to cover costs 
of closing your plant and laying off your work force. 
 
To help your calculations, a spreadsheet is attached. 
 
Circumstances may change during this regulatory period.  The regulator will inform you 




Instructions and worksheet 
 
You are a petroleum refinery that sells diesel fuel at a constant price of $50 per unit. Your 
marginal costs of producing diesel fuel are $10 per unit.  Each unit of diesel fuel you 
produce also produces one tonne of GHG pollution.  Your marginal costs of abating 
GHGs is given by: 
 
MAC5  =  300  - 20Z5   where Z5  is the tonnes of GHGs you release.  
 
A government regulator will be announcing various policies to help reduce GHG 
emissions.  Your job is to choose a pollution level (which also then determines your 
output level) that minimizes your total abatement costs. 
 
Your initial level of emissions is 15 tonnes of GHGs per year. 
 
If you cease production in any year, you will incur a fixed charge of $1000 to cover costs 
of closing your plant and laying off your work force. 
 
To help your calculations, a spreadsheet is attached. 
 
Circumstances may change during this regulatory period.  The regulator will inform you 




Instructions and worksheet 
 
You are a cement producer who can sell your product at a constant price of $20 per unit. 
Your marginal costs of producing cement are $5 per unit.  Each unit of cement you 
produce also produces one tonne of GHG pollution.  Your marginal costs of abating 
GHGs is given by: 
 
MAC6  =  200  - 10Z6   where Z6  is the tonnes of GHGs you release.  
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A government regulator will be announcing various policies to help reduce GHG 
emissions.  Your job is to choose a pollution level (which also then determines your 
output level) that minimizes your total abatement costs. 
 
Your initial level of emissions is 20 tonnes of GHGs per year.   
 
If you cease production in any year, you will incur a fixed charge of $1000 to cover costs 
of closing your plant and laying off your work force. 
 
To help your calculations, a spreadsheet is attached. 
 
Circumstances may change during this regulatory period.  The regulator will inform you 
of any changes.  
 
 
Permit Trading Exercise 
 
Report from Firm # _____ 
Names of Firm’s Directors:  ______________________________________________ 
 
Please turn in a copy of your spreadsheet to the regulator 
 
Be prepared to answer the following questions in a group discussion: 
 








3. Did you encounter any problems in trying to trade permits?  If so, what where these 




4. How would your permit trading activities change if your MAC curve fell, i.e., it was 









6. How would your permit trading change if the regulator reduced the total supply of 




7. From your company’s point of view, is permit trading your preferred strategy for 






8. If permits are distributed without charge by the regulator initially, what would you 
like this to be based on?   For example, past emissions, divided evenly among the 









Would you be willing to contribute to an environmental research organization, called 
ECOLECON, that studies global climate change?  This is a non-profit organization that 
employs ecologists and economists to do their research and is committed to finding 
politically feasible and economically efficient policy options to reduce GHG emissions.   
Ecolecon is internationally renowned for the high calibre of its work.  It depends on 
donations from individuals, companies, and philanthropic organizations to fund its work 
because it wants to be independent from any government.  Your donations are a tax 
deductible business expense. 
 
Please check the box below that best represents your willingness to support Ecolecon’s 
work.  Your pledge will be an annual payment that you can terminate with one year’s 





__________  zero dollars per year  
 
__________  $ 5 dollars per year 
 
__________  $10 dollars per year 
 
__________  $20 dollars per year 
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__________  $50 dollars per year 
 









Firm #    
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
No regulation
DATA
Unit price of good
MC of production per unit
Output of good 
GHG released
Total abatement costs






Profits after permit trades
  
 
[You can make this bigger, print in landscape mode, add scenarios, etc.] 
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